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Short Summary (as on COS) 
Game-based bargaining theory is presented to evaluate the potential of and stability of 
cooperative coalition among producers for enhancing producer returns and managing 
market price and income risk. Results clarify that collective bargaining can increase 
and stabilize producer profits when they face a single processor.   3 
Long summary (as on COS) 
Problem Statement Agricultural producers have long been concerned with low and 
unstable farm prices and income. These conditions have been interpreted as 
threatening to the feasibility of sustainable agricultural systems. Two approaches are 
pursued. One approach is central control or management through various forms of 
government intervention, such as government payments to farmers and price supports 
for farm products. Over the  past decade, this approach has been found to be 
financially unsustainable for the private sector (Levins, 2001). The other approach is 
that the government grants farmers the right to form cooperatives to collectively 
bargain with the handlers and processors of their products. The general objective of 
cooperatives is to offer their members a number of services such as production and 
marketing advice to enable them to do collectively what they cannot do individually.   
Many practical issues with respect to cooperative bargaining and decision making, 
their objectives and benefits, the actual process of negotiation, and the major 
problems they face, have been addressed in previous studies, see Bunje (1980), Iskow 
and Sexton (1992), Jermolowicz (1999), Gray and Kraenzle (2002), Hueth and 
Marcould (2002ab), and numerous USDA reports. However, agricultural economists 
have paid surprisingly little attention to the economic and market implications of such 
bargaining (Young and Hobbs, 2002).   
The purpose of this paper i s to fill this gap. Two objectives are pursued: 1) 
Clarification of the role cooperatives might play in providing collective bargaining for 
farmers to manage price risk and income level and risk. 2). Evaluation of the 
implications of associated changes in level and stability of producer returns that result 
from collective bargaining. Specifically, a) evaluate how the extent of collective 
bargaining may affect price, quantity and profit, and b) compare price level, quantity, 
and profit under collective bargaining versus the cases where farmers remain 
independent and face a single buyer (monopsony). 
Approach We consider a market for a homogeneous agricultural good such as milk or 
fruit. We suppose there are two kinds of traders: a processor and some homogenous  
individual farmers. We also suppose a single processor exists (e.g. a spatial 
monopsonist) that uses the raw product as an input to produce the final products and 
then sells to consumers in a competitive market. We suppose that individual farmers 
can coalesce to form a cooperative that markets their production to maximize the 
aggregate profit. Each member is paid the average price received for all product of 
like quality delivered during the duration of the transaction. We set up a bargaining 
model between  buyers and sellers for their contracts in which they bargain over price 
and/or quantity. Comparing two varieties of bargaining models with two extreme   4 
cases, competitive equilibrium and the monopsony market, we derive implications for 
the value and importance of collective bargaining.  
A series of cases is examined through alternative theoretical specifications. The first 
case is that two players bargain over both price and quantity. The results of the 
Rubinstein’s alternating bargaining model (1982) are a pplied. In equilibrium, the 
cooperative and the processor set quantity to the level, which maximizes the total 
surplus, and use the price as an instrument to divide the generated surplus. The second 
case is that two players bargain over the price, given that quantity is predetermined. A 
three-stage game is set up. In the first stage, the cooperative rationally chooses its 
supply that is also the trade quantity. The processor and the cooperative bargain over 
the price in the second stage, given that quantity is predetermined in the first stage. In 
the third stage, the processor sells the final product to a competitive market. For 
comparison, monopsony and competitive markets are analyzed. In addition, two 
issues are considered to vary these two cases. First, an outside option is introduced 
such that a farmer may decide whether or not to participate in the cooperative given 
outside options exist. On the buyer side, outside options are also introduced allowing 
procurement from alternative sources, e.g. nonmember production. A second issue 
considered is open membership. While a tradition of cooperatives, this organization 
has important implications for efficiency of management. Under closed membership, 
procurement volume, quality, and timing can be efficiently controlled.   
Results and Implications Our results show that bargaining increases prices paid to 
farmers when compared with monopsony and competitive markets, as expected. 
However, we also find the total surplus associated with bargaining is positive. We 
concl ude that collective bargaining can increase producer profits when they face 
individual processors that might exercise monopsony power in the absence of 
collective bargaining. In the absence of collective bargaining, we find it likely that 
individual producers will receive the lowest price and zero profit. Further, we 
illustrate how bargaining transfers surplus from the processor to the farmer 
cooperative. We find collective bargaining through cooperatives enables farmers to 
capture margins that otherwise would go to processors.   5 
Abstract 
The focus of this  paper is on pricing mechanisms that involve collective 
bargaining.  Collective bargaining by farmers constitutes an institutional response to 
an imbalance in farmer-processor bargaining power.  The economic analysis in this 
paper will help farmers to understand what they can realistically accomplish when 
they organize bargaining cooperatives.  We clarify the economic conditions, such as 
equilibrium price, equilibrium quantity, and welfare effect, which may f avor the 
success of collective bargaining. 
The results in this paper show that bargaining does not simply increase prices paid 
to farmers when compared with the situations in monopsony and in the competitive 
market; the total surplus associated with bargaining is also positive.  We conclude 
that collective bargaining can increase producer profits in marketplaces where they 
face individual processors that might exercise monopsony power in the absence of 
collective bargaining.  In the absence of collective bargaining, we find it likely that 
individual producers receive the lowest price and zero profit. 
   1 
1 Introduction 
Collective bargaining by farmers constitutes an institutional response to an 
imbalance in farmer-processor bargaining power that attempts to shift the equity of 
prices and terms-of-trade toward the collective’s interests, Sexton (1990).  The 
economic and market implications of such bargaining  have received little attention, 
Young and Hobbs  (2002).  The purpose of this  paper is to try to fill this gap  by 
considering the benefits of bargaining cooperatives and their conditionality on 
economic conditions, such as equilibrium price, equilibrium quantity, and welfare 
effect, which may favor the success of collective bargaining.  Two objectives are 
pursued: 1) Clarify the role cooperatives might play in providing collective bargaining 
for farmers and 2) Evaluate the producer economic outcomes that result from 
collective bargaining including  price, quantity and profit relative to cases where 
farmers remain independent and face a single buyer (monopsony). 
2 Approach 
We develop two simple bargaining games for analyzing the implications of 
collective bargaining.  Typically, formal negotiations involve rounds where the 
processor and the cooperative alternate offers or where the cooperative presents offers 
that are either accepted or rejected by the processor until an agreement is reached 
(Bunje, 1980).  These characteristics motivate our choice of the  Rubinstein   2 
bargaining model of alternating offers (see Rubinstein (1982)), instead of the Nash 
bargaining model, which has been adopted to describe other settings by von 
Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Venturini (1998).  At the optimum, the solution of the 
(noncooperative) Rubinstein model converges to the solution of  the (cooperative) 
Nash bargaining model
1.  In addition, a model with a market setting characterized by 
the presence of cooperative bargaining is examined, as well as its consequences on 
bargaining outcomes and on equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits.    
2.1 Salient features of collective bargaining in current agricultural markets 
In general, cooperatives negotiate with processors after a good estimate of product 
quantity and quality can be obtained, typically just prior to harvest.  This implies 
bargaining  is pursued with total supply being fixed and resulting prices are a function 
of a predetermined volume.  In most cases, processors purchase all member 
production.  An alternative condition is one where quantity decisions are based on 
processor need, and are determined prior to price negotiations.  The information 
known during negotiations includes projections of production, consumption, costs of 
production and harvesting, and related prices if they are public.  Four salient features 
of current ag  markets where bargaining occurs are important to note, see Hueth and 
Marcoul (2000b): 1) contract production is the dominant form of coordination, 2) 
                                                   
1 For details, see Muthoo (1999), chapter 3.   3 
local processing monoposony naturally exists, 3) production exhibits a high degree of 
geographic concentration, and 4) “outside options” for producers are limited.   
2.2 Models of bargaining 
An extensive literature has considered  bargaining methods and decision making 
for cooperatives, see  e.g.  Bunje (1980),  Iskow and Sexton (1992), Jermolowicz 
(1999), Gray and Kraenzle (2002),  or  Hueth and Marcould (2002ab).  Producer  
bargaining as a way to countervail the processors’ bargaining power has been 
investigated formally within the theoretical frameworks of game bargaining.  von 
Ungern-Stenberg (1996)  showed  that concentration in retailing is a source of 
bargaining power for retailers based on a Cournot model.  Dobson and Waterson 
(1997) considered a  Bertrand Nash setting of imperfectly competitive retailers and 
extended the von Ungern-Stenberg (1996) results to show that  competition  among 
retailers enhances social benefits of bargaining.  McDonald and Solow (1981) 
consider bargaining between a  labor union and a firm over wages and employment.  
They show efficient bargaining will push the firm to hire more workers than it would 
prefer at the negotiated wage.  Venturini (1998) examine Nash bargaining between a 
manufacturer and N retailers and finds that vertical competition increases retailers’ 
bargaining power and reduces equilibrium transfer prices.  Early work about the 
economic effects of agricultural price bargaining  by Helmberger and Hoo (1965)    4 
treats buyers of agricultural products as a colluding monopsony.  Sexton (1994) used 
noncooperative game theory to discuss how a bargaining mechanism works between 
processors and producers, but assumes that the trade quantity is independent of the 
bargaining outcome.  Kinnucan (1995) applied an equilibrium displacement model 
to examine the price and quantity impacts of price bargaining, where a farm 
cooperative cannot control i ts members’ supply.  His results show that the 
cooperative’s bargaining power is enhanced and a significant transfer from processors 
to producers results when demand is inelastic.   
3 The model 
Consider a market for a homogeneous agricultural good such as milk or fruit.  
Suppose there are two kinds of traders: a processor and some homogenous individual 
farmers.  A processor who is a spatial monopsonist uses the raw product as an input 
to produce the final products and then sells to consumers in a competitive market.  
Suppose that individual farmers can aggregate to become a cooperative.  The 
cooperative markets their production to maximize the aggregate profit.  Each 
member is paid the average price received for all product of like quality delivered 
during t he duration of the transaction.  The reason we consider the processor as a 
spatial monopsonist is as follows: Packer/processor concentration in the beef industry 
has received considerable attention from cattle producers.  One of the recent GIPSA   5 
packer concentration studies (Hayenga, et al. 1996) revealed that 95 percent of cattle 
are purchased within a 270-miles radius of the plant.  In addition, their results 
indicate that in the Upper Midwest region packers were estimated to be paying an 
average of $0.09/cwt less for cattle purchased within 100 miles and $0.29/cwt less for 
cattle purchased between 100 to 300 miles of the plant.  The possibility of 
monopsony power leading to a lower price of cattle was found.   
The contract is set up after the cooperative and the processor bargain over the 
contract price and/or quantity of delivery.  This bargaining is accomplished by an 
alternating-offers procedure
2.  Successful bargaining identifies mutual benefits and 
resolves conflicting interests in a way that results  in both joint and individual gains 
from cooperation. (Muthoo, 1999, Ch.1).  In the model, we assume that there is no 
opportunity for either player to find opportunities to bargain with other agents, i.e., no 
outside options
3 are allowed.   
During a bargaining session, an offer is represented by a pair (p,q) where 0 p ‡  
is the offered price and 0 q ‡  is the contract quantity.  If the cooperative and the 
processor reach agreement on a pair ( p ,q), then player i’s (i=C (cooperative) and P’s 
(processor) payoff is specified as the form of (,)exp()
i
i pqr pt - , whereexp() i rt -  is 
                                                   
2 The alternating-offers procedure is a process of making offers and counteroffers, which continues 
until a player accepts an offer. 
3 According to the alternating-offers procedure, an outside option exists when a player rejects an offer 
and opts out, in which case negotiations terminate in disagreement.   6 
player i’s discount factor,  0 i r >  is time preference, and  t is the time length of the 
bargaining period.  On the other hand, if the players perpetually disagree, then each 
player’s payoff is zero.  The game equilibrium determines a resulting price and 
quantity pair that is assumed to have been transacted instantaneously. 
The processor’s choice problem 
If the processor buys a quantity  q at a price  p, then the processor’s profit is: 
pq q F p pq q R q p b
P - = - = ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) 1 ( p , 
where  b p  is the wholesale price of the processed product and  ) (q F  is the 
production function of the wholesale product and its byproducts.   ) ( ) ( q F p q R b =  is 
the revenue obtained by the processor by transforming the quantity  q of the input 
into some output and then selling the output on some competitive final market at the 
price  b p .  Define 
2 () Fqaqbq =+ .  Assume that  0 ) ( > ¢ q F  and  0 ) ( < ¢ ¢ q F , and 
more specifically,  aq b 2 0 > >  and  0 < a . The processor’s demand function is 










The cooperative’s choice problem  
The cooperative serves as a seller, and its profit can be represented as follows: 
) ( ) , ( ) 3 ( q C pq q p
C - = p ,   7 
where  ) (q C  is the cost to the cooperative of producing the quantity  q of the input.  
Define 
2 ) ( dq q C =  and assume tha t  0 ) ( > ¢ q C  and  0 ) ( > ¢ ¢ q C , so  0 > d .    The 
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Next, we consider alternative bilateral equilibria.  The first case i s that two 
players bargain over both price and quantity.  The second case is that two players 
bargain over the price, given that quantity is predetermined.   
3.1 Case 1: Rubinstein Model 
The processor and the cooperative are assumed to bargain over the price and 
quantity of trade according to an alternating-offers protocol.  Bargaining, as defined 
by Muthoo, occurs when two players have a common interest to cooperate, but have 
conflicting interests over exactly how to cooperate.  In the model presented here, the 
common interest is the gain from trade (transactions resulting from agreement).  This 
gain is the sum of both the processor’s and the cooperative’s surplus.  An offer is a 
pair  ) , ( q p , where  0 ‡ p  and  0 ‡ q .  For convenience, denote exp() ii r qt ”- .  
Notice that0 1 < < qi .  The cost implied by introduction of the discount rate ( i r ) 
results due to the time required for bargaining and, given that this cost will reflect 
time value, it can be interpreted as a measure of patience.  If players differ in 
patience, it follows that the more patient (small discount rate) agent will hold greater   8 
bargaining power.  As will be clear, a player’s bargaining power can b e interpreted 
as conditioned on patience, or the discount rate.   
Using Rubinstein’s results (1982), the equilibrium share  ) , , ( C P i w
i = of gains 
























, respectively.  These are exactly the proportions of total gains from 
trade weighted by the opponent’s preference.  Also, within  in the limit, as the time 
interval between two consecutive offers tends to zero ( 0 ﬁ t ),  the equilibrium 
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 increases, so 
P w  decreases and 
C w  increases.   
Next, we assume that both processor and cooperative have the same discount 
rates, i.e.,  PC rr = .  It follows that the two players (processor and cooperative) 
equally share the total surplus (or, gains from trade).  In the unique subgame perfect 
equilibria (SPE), the equilibrium quantity trade 
e q  maximizes the total surplus.  
The total surplus is: 
2 2 ) ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) 5 ( dq bq aq p q p q p q p S b
C P - + = + = p p  
Thus, 









=    9 
In the Rubinstein model, the equilibrium price is a weighted combination of the 
equilibrium average revenue and equilibrium average cost, and the weights depend on 
the relative bargaining power.  That is,  )
q























Since the processor and the cooperative have the same discount factor, the 
equilibrium trade price 
e p  equally divides the generated surplus  ) ( ) (
e C e P q q p p + , 
i.e. 
) ap d (
) ap d ( bp
)
q
) q ( C ) q ( R
















3.2 Case 2: Quantity is predetermined  
Next, consider a three-stage game.  First, the cooperative rationally chooses its 
supply 
C q , the trade quantity.  The processor and the cooperative bargain over the 
price p in the second stage.   Third, the processor sells the final product to a 
competitive market.  The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) concept characterizes 
the outcome of this game.  Following backward induction to a solution, in the third 
stage, the processor sells the final product,  ) (
C q F , to some competitive market and 
receives a competitive price  b p .  The processor’s profit is 
C C C
b
C P pq ) bq ) q ( a ( p ) q , p ( - + =
2 p which  evaluated at  the cooperative’s 
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.  While two players bargain, the relative bargaining power plays a role 
in the equilibrium partition.  Denote  i b , where  C P i , = as the processor’s and the   10 
cooperative’s bargaining power, respectively.  Assume  i b  is exogenously 
determined by some behavior parameters, such as risk aversion, or by some market 
conditions, such as supply or demand elasticity.  For a stable equilibrium, the sharing 
rule that allocates total surplus requires that the equilibrium price 
e p equally satisfies 




P q p q p p b p b = . A  higher 
value of  i b  means a lower bargaining power for player  i . 
Assume that two players have the same bargaining power, i.e.,  C P b b = .  Thus, the 
players’ profits are equal:  )
d
p
q , p ( )
d
p
q , p (
C P
2 2
= = = p p  which implies a 
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To solve the first stage,  the 
cooperative’s profit function (3) is evaluated at the equilibrium price, and optimized 











For comparison, monopsony 
and competitive markets are introduced below. 
3.3 Case 3: Monopsony 
A monopsonistic market setting occurs when individual producers do not coalesce. 
The monoposonist  price for each quantity purchased is given by the market supply 
curve for the input.  We use the inverse supply function from equation (4),  dq p 2 = .  
Hence, optimizing  the processor’s profit function  by choice of  demand 
M q   yields 
the equilibrium price 
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3.4 Case 4: A competitive market 

















Table 3.1 summarizes the equilibrium quantities and the equilibrium prices.   
TABLE 3.1: THE RESUL TANT EQUILIBRIUM QUANTITIES AND PRICES FROM 4 CASES 
EQUILIBRIUM 












































































= 4  
First, we compare the equilibrium quantities.  The monopsony (case 3) 
equilibrium demand for the input is clearly lower than market competition.  The 
monopsonist is the only buyer having more market power than those individual sellers.  
Also, the quantity traded by the Rubinstein model is the same in competitive 
equilibrium.  This result is straightforward: in the Rubinstein model, the processor 
and the cooperative set quantity to the level that maximizes the total surplus.  This is 
exactly how a competitive equilibrium works.  As for the relationships among other 
cases, the following calculations provide some information.   12 
) )( 3 ( 2
) (
) 16 ( 4 2
b b
b b





= -  
In the model,  2 q  is derived from a bargaining equilibrium, where the cooperative 
rationally chooses the trade quantity and the price equals two player’s profits.  
Intuitively, the bargaining outcome is between the monopsony and competitive 
equilibrium.  That is, (16) is less than zero and  0 < + b ap d .   Therefore, 
3 2 4 1 q q q q > > = . 
Next, we check the equilibrium price.   
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Equations (18) and (19) show that the two bargaining equilibrium prices are higher 
than the competitive price.  Besides, the price solved from the Rubinstein model is 
higher than the price from case 2, where the quantity is predetermined.  In the 
Rubinstein model, the price is a weighted average of the processor’s revenue and the 
cooperative’s cost.  The sign of (18) depends on parameterizations of the processor’s 
final product market, his production function, and the cooperative’s cost function.  
Thus, a positive sign might not be a general result, but provides information about 
what elements may affect the bargaining price. 
The reason why the price in the Rubinstein model is higher than that of case 2,   13 
where quantity is predetermined, is not straightforward.  In case 2, the price is 
derived from equaling two player’s profits, given that trade quantity is predetermined, 
whereas the equilibrium price of the Rubinstein model is weighted by some of two 
players’ profits.  Therefore, if the trade quantity in case 2 is large, then this large 
supply drives the price down, and vice versa.  Further, the result shows that the 
cooperative’s payoff may not increase as a result of being able to set the trade quantity.  
In other words, the buyer dominates the seller in this model.  Overall, 
3 4 2 1 p p p p > > > . 
Next, consider the profits of the processor and the cooperative in each case.   
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Case 3 is a monopsony market.  The processor appropriates all profit and leaves 
zero profit to the cooperative.  Case 4 considers a competitive market.  The profit 
earned by each player depends on his technology.  The differential profits for each   14 
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From equations (20)-(24),  3421
PPPP pppp >>>.  The processor receives the highest 
profit from the monopsony market, and the lowest profit from case 1.  This clarifies 
the potential of collective bargaining to establish a balance for a single processor. 
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p p , since  0 < + b ap d . 
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b b b C C
ap d ap d
ap d ap d dp b
p p , since  0 < + b ap d . 
The result shows that 
C C C C
3 4 2 1 p p p p > > > .  The cooperative receives the lowest 
profit (zero) in the monopsony market, but receives the highest profit under collective 
bargaining, considered by the Rubinstein model.  The bargaining activity transfers 
the processor’s profit to the cooperative. 
For total surplus, we have the differential between Case 2, where quantity is 
predetermined, and Case 3, the monopsony market.   
2
2 2 2 2 2
3 2 ) 3 )( 2 ( 4
) 2 7 (
) 27 (
b b
b b b C P C P
ap d ap d




+ + p p      15 
The third row of Table 3.2 shows that the competitive equilibrium supports the 
highest total surplus.  Collective bargaining following the Rubinstein model provides 
the same highest total surplus.  Although the trade quantity is the same with the 
Rubinstein model and the competitive market, the higher equilibrium price associated 
with collective bargaining in the Rubinstein model reduces the processor’s profit at a 
level equal to the increases in the cooperative’s profit.  The sign of equation ( 27) 
depends on the sign of 
2 2 2 2 7 b b p a adp d - - .  Without comparison with case 2, where 
quantity is predetermined, the monopsony market has the smallest total surplus.  On 
the other hand, even though the cooperative has the right to rationally decide the trade 
quantity, the total surplus might be lower than it can receive in the monopsony market.  
Overall,  1423 ()
PCPCPCPC and pppp
++++ => . 
In sum, four cases are examined in this paper: the Rubinstein alternating-offers 
procedure, bargaining over price only, monopsony, and competitive equilibrium.  
The players trade the same quantity in the Rubinstein model as in the competitive 
market.  In monopsony, the smallest quantity is traded.  In addition, bargaining 
models result in a higher price, than do the competitive  case.  By comparison, the 
monopsony results in the lowest price.  Moreover, we evaluated four cases from the 
perspective of each player.  For the processor, there is no doubt that he collects all of 
the surplus in the monopsony market.  Further, bargaining also provides greater   16 
profit than does the competitive market.  Similarly, bargaining results in greater 
profits for the cooperative than are available from a competitive market or from the 
monopsony case.  Thus, the function and importance of cooperative bargaining is 
realized. 
4.1 Discussions on bargaining power 
The above results for Case 1 and 2 rely on the assumption that two players have the 
same bargaining power, recall  C P r r =  for Case 1 and  C P b b =  for Case 2.  We 
now relax this assumption and consider a situation where the processor has greater 
bargaining power than the cooperative, i.e.,  C P r r <  for Case 1 and  C P b b <  for 
Case 2.  In Case 1, this assumption does not affect the equilibrium quantity, because, 
under all bargaining power scenarios, it results in a Pareto optimal total surplus.  In 
the Rubinstein model, the equilibrium price is a weighted combination of the 
equilibrium average revenue and equilibrium average cost, and these weights depend 
on the relative bargaining power. Recall equation (7).   
Plugging the equilibrium quantity (6) into (28), the equilibrium price (7) becomes: 
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.  The 
equilibrium price increases (decreases) as the processor (cooperative) has higher 
bargaining power (the small value of  P r  ( C r )).   17 
As for Case 2, where quantity is predetermined, if we relax the assumption of two 
players with the same bargaining power, according to the sharing rule (recall 






























.  That is, t he greater the processor’s 
relative bargaining power (the lower value of  P b ), the lower is the equilibrium price.  
On the other hand, increased cooperative bargaining power will result in a greater 
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, so the equilibrium quantity will change as the 
bargaining power changes.  The cooperative will rationally supply more as its 
bargaining power increases, and vice versa. 
Also considering the other two cases, monoposony and competitive market, the 
results for the four cases with respect to equilibrium prices and quantities may change.  
Assume that the bargaining power of the processor is greater than that of the 
cooperative.  The equilibrium quantity in Case 2 decreases as the processor gains 
greater bargaining power, until the quantity of the monopsony is reached, and thus, 
3 2 4 1 q q q q ﬁ > = .  In addition, the equilibrium prices of both C ase 1 and 2 
decrease as the processor gains greater bargaining power, and may converge to the   18 
monopsony price if the processor has the absolute market power.  The magnitudes of 
these decreases depend on the values of  i r  and  i b .  In other words, there is a 
possibility that the order of   3 4 2 1 p p p p > > >  may not hold. 
The above discussions consider the case where there is one processor versus some 
homogenous farmers.  If we consider a case with more than one processor, say two 
processors, then the type of competition between two processors has to been 
considered.  For example, we assume that two processors compete in a Cournot 
fashion in a wholesale market, as in von Ungern-Stenberg (1996).  That is, one can 
make more profit as he can supply more in the wholesale market; in other words, he 
has to get more supply from the raw product market.  Thus, in order to get sufficient 
input supply, processors may bid aggressively in the raw product market.  This, in 
turn, decreases the relative bargaining power of processors, and increases the price of 
raw product.  Such oligopsony situations deserve further study. 
5 Membership Decision and Outside Option 
It is generally agreed that a key factor in a bargaining cooperative’s effectiveness 
is its ability to control a substantial supply of the product (Helmberger and Hoo 
(1965) and Bunje (1980)).  Member farmers who form cooperatives provide the 
supply of the product.  Thus, supply-control by a cooperative can be enhanced by 
increasing the number of member-farmers.  To design effective membership   19 
structures, it is critical that cooperatives have accurate information about their 
membership.   
While most group marketing efforts by farmers are organized as cooperatives, 
individual farmers must decide whether or not to participate in the cooperative.  The 
crucial problem is to define the farmers’ outside options, i.e. determine what 
advantages can be expected from joining the cooperative as compared to not joining.  
In theory, if each player’s outside option is less than or equal to the share he receives 
from the bargaining model, then the outside options have no influence on the 
equilibrium sharing
4. 
von Ungern -Sternberg (1996) simply defines the producer’s outside option as 
trading with other buyers.  He considers a monopoly situation with one producer 
facing homogenous buyers where those buyers are in a Cournot type competition.  If 
the producer does not reach an agreement with one of the buyers, then an outside 
option must be available from other buyers.  Within the Cournot, competition a 
decrease in the number of buyers leads to an increase in equilibrium final product 
prices.   
In reality, several commodities, such as potatoes and apples, do have good spot 
market alternatives (Iskow and Sexton, 1992).  According to the USDA report in 
                                                   
4 See details in Muthoo (1999), chapter 5.   20 
1997, the most common marketing techniques used by cooperatives are long-term 
contracts, short-term contracts, electronic marketing, and open market sales
5.  
Long-term contracts are a year or more in length, short-term contracts are less than a 
year, and open market sales are made at prices and terms available at the time of sale.  
Electronic marketing is a transaction completed over computer auctions or satellite 
video. 
In this section, we assume that the only marketing alternative for those individual 
farmers who do not join a cooperative is to trade in the spot market, a competitive 
market.  The outside option for an individual farmer can be modeled as follows.  A 
farmer, if he supplies to the spot market, will maximize his expected profit based on 
the expected spot price, 
e
s p .  A farmer’s expected profit, 
i
s p , can be written as: 




s q d q p - = p , 
where 
2 ) (
i q d  is the quadratic production cost to the farmer, and  d  is a positive 
parameter.  The first-order condition derives the optimal supply to the spot market. 
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Plugging (29) into (28), the farmer’s expected profit in the spot market can be written 
as:  
                                                   
5 Considering different cooperatives with different marketing techniques, see White, Jr. (1993) and 
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This establishes a reservation profit, which profits from selling to a cooperative must 
exceed. 
By contrast, if a farmer chooses to join a cooperative where  N  homogenous 
member-farmers are assumed in the cooperative, then recall from Section 3.3.1 that 
the farmer’s production and price received from the cooperative according to the  






























= p  
Intuitively, the outside option (the expected profit in the spot market) matters only 
if it is above the bargaining outcome payoff.  That is, an individual farmer is willing 
to join a cooperative as long as he can get at least the same profit as what he would 
earn if he chooses to stay outside.  That is, 
i
s
i p p ‡ .  However, free entry and 
arbitrage between sales to the spot market and cooperatives will imply 
i
s
i p p = .  
That is, the profit received from the cooperative due to bargaining will be equal to the 
profit received from the spot market under the assumption of homogenous farmers   22 
and open membership
6.  According to this argument, the most efficient number of 
members for the cooperative can be derived by equating (28) and (30).  That is, 













From (31), it is obvious that the optimal number of members decreases as the 
expected spot price increases.  The greater the expected spot price, the more 
attractive it is for a farmer to stay outside the cooperative.  In addition, an increase in 
the processed price results in an increase in the optimal number of members.  Note 
that the sharing rule of the Rubinstein model in case 1 is assumed to equally divide 
the total surplus.  Increases in the processed price are expected to cause the total 
surplus to increase, which means that both processor’s and cooperative’s profits 
increase as well.  Hence, given  N
 
members in the cooperative, every member’s 
profit increases when the total surplus increases.   
Furthermore, just as individual farmers have an outside option, processors have an 
alternative to obtain supply from the spot market.  The most obvious alternative 
supply source for processors is nonmember production.  In other words, processors 
can purchase from the spot market.  Since the spot market is competitive, the price is 
                                                   
6 Open membership is one of the first cooperative principles, which distinguishes cooperative from 
non-cooperative businesses.  The others include one member has one vote, political and religious 
neutrality, no unusual risk assumption, etc.  See details in Co-op 101: An Introduction to 
Cooperatives, USDA, 1997.   23 
a decreasing function of quantity.  If more farmers joined the cooperative, then less 
production is supplied to the spot market, and, in turn, the spot price may increase.  
In sum, the implications of an outside option for individual farmer’s decisions, and 
individual farmer’s decisions for an outside option, are interrelated.  The trade-off 
exists between joining a cooperative and staying outside.  This is because, while a 
farmer decides to join the cooperative to share the collective bargaining profit, his 
entry will reduce the sharing profit, and the expected profit to stay outside of the 
cooperative increases because of i ncreases in the expected spot price.  Thus, this 
endogeneity of the outside option is an important issue to be kept in the model, when 
explicitly modeling such a situation. 
6 Conclusions 
Economic reality is forcing farmers to manage their industry and earn more profits 
from the marketplace (Levins, 2001).  The weakness for an individual farmer in 
marketing can be addressed as follows.  First, few farmers who market their 
production to a processor can match the buyer’s power and size.  Despite the growth 
in the size of individual farmers, few can match the power of the buyer except when 
joining with others to achieve a measure of equity (Bunje, 1980).  Second, while 
bargaining, the Rubinstein model has shown the need to play games with timing in 
order to gain an advantage.  Few individual farmers have the flexibility to deny the   24 
advantages that have been theirs by default.  Third, few individual farmers have the 
time to analyze the market for their production.  Without a skillful representative and 
basic information, rational and accurate marketing decisions may not be made.  
Therefore, by working together in collective bargaining through cooperatives, farmers 
gain better control of their own economic destiny. 
This paper identifies the problem of whether bargaining is appropriate for a given 
market environment.  We set up a bargaining model between buyers and sellers for 
their contracts in which they bargain over price and/or quantity.  Comparing two 
varieties of bargaining models with two extreme cases, competitive equilibrium and 
the monopsony market, we can gain more insights into collective bargaining’s value 
and importance.  Table 3.3 summarizes the rank of effects on price, quantity, and 
profit across the four cases. 
TABLE 3.3 RANK OF EFFECTS ACROSS CASES 











Equilibrium price  1  2  4  3 
Equilibrium 
quantity 
1  3  4  1 
Processor profit  4  3  1  2 
Cooperative/farmers 
profit 
1  2  4  3 
Total profit  1  3or4  3or4   1   25 
The results in this paper show that bargaining doesn’t just increase prices paid to 
farmers when compared with monopsony and competitive markets; the total surplus 
associated with bargaining is also positive.  We conclude that collective bargaining 
can increase producer profits in marketplaces, where they face individual processors 
that might exercise monopsony power in the absence of collective bargaining.  In the 
absence of collective bargaining, we find it likely that individual producers will 
receive the lowest price and zero profit. 
In addition, bargaining’s success or effectiveness should be evaluated based on its 
total impact, thereby considering total surplus.  As the competitive market improves 
total surplus, the formation of the bargaining unit serves to  transfer some of the 
surplus from the processor to the farmer cooperative.  In other words, collective 
bargaining through cooperatives enables farmers to capture margins from the 
marketplace, which otherwise would go to processors.  Hence, bargaining reduces 
asymmetric bargaining power between two groups, while also maximizing total 
surplus.  Also, collective bargaining through cooperatives can be an effective vehicle 
for farmers integrating down the market channel.       26 
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